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Towards	a	UK	Trade	Policy	Post-Brexit:	
The	Beginning	of	a	Complex	Journey	
	
Holger	Hestermeyer	&	Federico	Ortino		
Abstract	Trade	 has	 had	 a	 stunning	 return	 to	 the	 spotlight	 since	 the	 results	 of	 the	 Brexit	referendum	were	announced.	While	it	is	much	too	early	to	speak	of	failure	or	success	of	the	UK’s	trade	policy,	we	allege	that	the	current	debate	shows	a	lack	of	understanding	of	modern	international	trade	law	and	policy.	This	in	turn	leads	to	a	lack	of	appreciation	of	the	tasks	ahead	for	the	UK.	The	limited	aim	of	this	short	article	is	to	point	out	the	scope	of	 some	 of	 the	 key	 challenges	 and	 the	 complexities	 that	 the	 UK	will	 face	 on	 the	 road	towards	 a	 post-Brexit	 trade	 policy.	 We	 consider	 a	 proper	 appreciation	 of	 these	complexities	to	be	vital	for	a	transparent,	fair	and	inclusive	formulation	of	the	UK’s	trade	policies,	which	will	determine	not	only	 the	UK’s	economic	 fate,	but	also	 the	UK’s	 laws	and	many	of	its	domestic	policies	for	decades	to	come.				
Introduction	Trade	 has	 had	 a	 stunning	 return	 to	 the	 spotlight	 since	 the	 results	 of	 the	 Brexit	referendum	were	announced.	Hardly	a	day	goes	by	without	front-page	news	on	how	the	United	Kingdom	(UK)	 is	succeeding	or	 failing	 in	trade	politics.	While	some	reports	are	confident	that	the	UK	will	quickly	conclude	numerous	trade	agreements,	which	will	put	it	in	a	more	advantageous	trade	position	than	EU	Member	States,1	others	state	that	the	UK	is	unlikely	to	reach	any	trade	agreement	in	a	reasonable	time	frame	and	recommend	focusing	on	reaching	a	favourable	deal	with	the	EU.2	The	uncertainty	is	compounded	by	the	perception	that	 the	government’s	goals	 for	 the	upcoming	negotiations	with	the	EU																																																									1	See	e.g.	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/09/18/uk-can-strike-quick-deal-with-usa-says-former-trade-minister-fra/;	https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1460237/david-davis-tells-brussels-where-to-go-as-uk-begins-trade-negotiations-with-non-eu-countries/;	http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/690191/Britain-ten-Brexit-trade-deals-lined-up-economic-powerhouses	2	Many	reports	in	the	Financial	Times	and	the	Guardian	point	to	looming	difficulties.	
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are	somewhat	opaque.	“Red	lines”	seem	to	dominate	the	picture	in	that	regard:	the	UK	wants	 full	 control	over	 immigration	and	 law-making	and	will	not	 submit	 to	 control	of	the	Court	of	 Justice	of	the	EU	(CJEU)	or	pay	into	the	EU’s	budget.3	On	the	contrary,	the	government’s	 rhetoric	 with	 respect	 to	 free	 trade	 agreements	 is	 entirely	 positive,	declaring	that	the	UK	aims	to	“become	a	world	leader	in	free	trade”4	leading	the	charge	for	“a	fair	and	rule-based	system	for	global	trade	and	investment”.5		While	 it	 is	much	 too	 early	 to	 speak	 of	 failure	 or	 success	 of	 the	UK’s	 trade	 policy,6	we	allege	 that	 the	 current	 debate	 shows	 a	 lack	 of	 understanding	 of	modern	 international	trade	law	and	policy.	This	in	turn	leads	to	a	lack	of	appreciation	of	the	tasks	ahead	for	the	UK.	A	short	article	can	hardly	pretend	to	lay	out	a	detailed	list	of	such	tasks,	let	alone	to	 provide	 solutions	 for	 many	 of	 the	 related	 issues.	 This	 is	 not	 our	 goal.	 We	 merely	intend	to	point	out	the	scope	of	some	of	the	key	challenges	and	the	complexities	that	the	UK	 will	 face	 on	 the	 road	 towards	 a	 post-Brexit	 trade	 policy.	 We	 consider	 a	 proper	appreciation	 of	 these	 complexities	 to	 be	 vital	 for	 a	 transparent,	 fair	 and	 inclusive	formulation	of	the	UK’s	trade	policies,	which	will	determine	not	only	the	UK’s	economic	fate,	but	also	the	UK’s	laws	and	many	of	its	domestic	policies	for	decades	to	come.		
A.	Modern	International	Trade	Law	The	 first	 step	 in	 this	 journey	 is	 to	 define	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 undertaking:	 what	 is	encompassed	 by	 “international	 trade	 law”.	 Until	 the	 1960s,	 the	 scope	 of	 trade	agreements	was	 comparatively	 narrow.7	The	 first	major	multilateral	 trade	 agreement,	the	1947	General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade	(GATT),	covers	 trade	 in	goods	only.																																																									3	http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-05/u-k-has-four-red-lines-in-eu-brexit-talks-davis-aide-says.	4	Liam	Fox’s	free	trade	speech	delivered	on	29	September	2016	https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/liam-foxs-free-trade-speech.	5	Liam	Fox	speaking	at	the	launch	of	the	World	Trade	Report	2016	on	27	September	2016	https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/launch-of-the-world-trade-report-2016-inclusive-trade-and-smes.	6	The	UK	has	allegedly	not	even	taken	the	decision	to	leave	the	EU	according	to	its	constitutional	requirements.	See	Hestermeyer,	How	Brexit	Will	Happen:	A	Brief	Primer	
on	European	Union	Law	and	Constitutional	Law	Questions	Raised	by	Brexit,	33	Journal	of	Int’l	Arbitration	429	(2016).	7	For	the	history	of	the	GATT,	in	particular	the	US	reciprocal	trade	agreements	preceeding	it,	see	Jackson,	History	of	the	General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade,	in	Wolfrum,	Stoll	&	Hestermeyer	(eds),	WTO	Trade	in	Goods,	Brill	2011,	1.	For	a	discussion	of	earlier	treaties	see	Paulus,	Treaties	of	Friendship,	Commerce	and	Navigation,	in	Wolfrum	(ed.),	MPEPIL,	OUP	2011.	
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One	 of	 its	 goals	 was	 to	 channel	 trade	 barriers	 into	 tariffs	 and	 negotiate	 these	 tariffs	down	 in	 successive	 trade	 negotiation	 rounds.	 The	 tariff	 commitments	 of	 WTO	Contracting	 Parties	 differ	 from	 country	 to	 country	 and	 are	 contained	 in	 so-called	“schedules”.	 Besides	 obligations	 pertaining	 to	 these	 schedules	 the	 GATT	 contains	obligations	 of	 non-discrimination	 between	 imported	 and	 domestic	 products	 (Art.	 III),	between	 imported	products	 from	different	GATT	Contracting	Parties	 (Art.	 I),	 a	ban	on	quantitative	 restrictions	 (Art.	 XI),	 freedom	 of	 transit	 (Art.	 V),	 rules	 on	 dumping	 and	subsidies	 (Artt.	VI,	XVI),	 exceptions	 to	 the	obligations	 (Artt.	XX,	XXI),	 a	mechanism	 for	settling	 disputes	 (Artt.	 XXII,	 XXIII),	 and	 a	 provision	 on	 signing	 other	 free	 trade	agreements	(Art.	XXIV).	Under	the	GATT	regime	tariffs	were	reduced	significantly.8		However,	 as	 tariff	 walls	 were	 dismantled,	 other	 impediments	 to	 trade	 started	 to	 be	tackled	in	trade	talks	as	well.	Some	of	these	are	rather	technical	and	rarely	capture	the	attention	 of	 the	 public,	 such	 as	matters	 of	 customs	 valuation.	Most	 of	 them,	 however,	involve	sensitive	and	complex	domestic	policies,	 for	example,	discriminatory	practices	in	 government	 procurement,	 or	 different	 standards	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 consumers,	intellectual	property,	the	environment	and	public	health.	It	was	not	just	the	breadth	and	variety	 of	 these	 so-called	 non-tariff	 barriers	 to	 trade	 that	 broadened	 the	 scope	 of	international	trade	agreements,	but	also	the	inclusion	of	a	liberalisation	agenda	for	trade	in	services.	The	establishment	in	1995	of	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO)	with	the	additional	 agreements	 on	 trade	 in	 services	 (GATS),	 intellectual	 property	 standards	(TRIPS),	technical	regulations	(TBT)	and	sanitary	measures	(SPS)	was	the	first	clear	sign	of	the	widening	scope	of	trade	law,	but	by	no	means	the	last.	Since	then	many	regional	trade	 agreements	 have	 followed	 a	 similar	 approach,	 although	 of	 course,	 not	 all	 such	agreements	cover	all	of	these	issues	and	not	all	of	these	issues	are	subject	to	rules	of	the	same	legal	strength	or	depth.	However,	it	is	fair	to	say	that	many	areas	of	law	are	on	the	table	when	trade	agreements	are	negotiated.	To	 illustrate	 the	scope	of	modern	 international	 trade	 law	 it	 is	worthwhile	 to	 look	at	a	recently	 negotiated	 trade	 agreement,	 such	 as	 the	 Trans-Pacific	 Partnership	 (TPP)	negotiated	between	the	United	States	and	11	of	its	partners,	including	Australia,	Mexico,	Vietnam	and	Singapore,	but	not	the	European	Union.	The	TPP	comprises	30	chapters	as	well	as	annexes	and	related	 instruments.	 It	 is	not	 limited	 to	 traditional	 trade	 in	goods	and	 trade	 in	 services,	 but	 includes	 –	 for	 example	 –	 chapters	 on	 investment,	 the																																																									8	See	WTO,	Understanding	the	WTO,	The	GATT	years:	from	Havana	to	Marrakesh,	available	at	https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm.	
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temporary	entry	for	business	personnel,	government	procurement,	competition	policy,	intellectual	 property,	 labour,	 environment,	 regulatory	 coherence	 and	 transparency	 &	anti-corruption.9	At	 times,	 the	provisions	 in	 the	agreement	are	vague	and	aspirational,	but	many	of	 them	are	concrete	and	require	parties	 to	pass	very	specific	national	 laws.	Thus,	 just	to	name	two	seemingly	exotic	examples,	under	the	TPP	states	have	to	grand	trademarks	 for	 sounds	 (Art.	 18.18)	 and	 protect	 biologics,	 a	 category	 of	 drugs,	 e.g.	through	test	data	exclusivity	for	at	least	eight	years	(Art.	18.52	para.	1	lit.	a).	Even	 though	 trade	 negotiators	will	 and	 do	 use	 other	 agreements	 as	 references,	 trade	agreements	 differ	 substantially	 according	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 negotiating	 states.	Several	states,	for	example,	are	hesitant	to	agree	on	detailed	obligations	with	respect	to	the	 movement	 of	 natural	 persons,	 while	 others,	 e.g.	 China,	 strive	 to	 include	 such	obligations	 in	 some	 of	 their	 trade	 deals.	 Thus,	 under	 the	 China-Australia	 FTA,	 which	entered	 into	 force	 on	 20	 December	 2015,	 Australia	 provides	 guaranteed	 access	 to	Chinese	citizens	 for	e.g.	 intra-corporate	 transferees	and	 independent	executives	 for	up	to	four	years,	installers	and	servicers	for	up	to	3	months,	business	visitors	for	up	to	90	days	or	6	months	for	service	sellers	and	for	contractual	service	suppliers	for	up	to	four	years	 including	 guaranteed	 access	 for	 up	 to	 a	 combined	 total	 of	 1800	 in	 four	occupations:	Chinese	 chefs,	WuShu	martial	 arts	 coaches,	Traditional	Chinese	Medicine	practitioners	 and	 Mandarin	 language	 tutors	 subject	 to	 standard	 immigration	requirements.10		These	 examples	 show	 that	 modern	 trade	 agreements	 go	 far	 beyond	 mere	 tariff	arrangements.	 They	 encompass	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 legal	 areas	 ranging	 from	 services	regulation	 to	 intellectual	 property	 and	 immigration	 and	 impose	 both	 substantive	 and	procedural	requirements.	Crucially,	as	legally	binding	agreements	they	all	limit	a	state’s	sovereign	 choices.	 In	 this	 regard	 while	 they	 may	 differ	 from	 EU	 law	 in	 scope	 and	enforceability,11	they	do	not	in	substance:	the	portrayal	of	EU	law	as	limiting	sovereignty	and	trade	law	as	merely	guaranteeing	free	trade	is	a	fallacy.	Trade	agreements	much	like																																																									9	The	text	of	the	TPP	is	available	at	https://ustr.gov/tpp/#text.	10	Australian	Government,	China-Australia	Free	Trade	Agreement,	Fact	sheet:	Movemen	
tof	natural	persons,	http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/chafta/fact-sheets/Pages/fact-sheet-movement-of-natural-persons.aspx.	11	The	latter	is	due	to	the	legal	doctrines	of	direct	effect	and	primacy	of	EU	law	developed	in	the	1960s,	which	allow	individuals	to	directly	rely	on	EU	law	in	national	courts	and	make	EU	law	prevail	over	national	law	in	cases	of	conflict.	See	ECJ	Case	26/62	Van	Gent	en	Loos,	ECLI:EU:C:1963:1	and	Case	6/64	Costa	v.	ENEL,	ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.	
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EU	law	contain	commitments	by	a	state	to	apply	certain	rules	and	refrain	from	passing	others.	The	 fewer	barriers	 to	 trade	a	state	wants	 to	encounter,	 the	more	obligations	 it	will	have	to	include	in	its	trade	agreements.	The	real	question	that	we	need	to	answer	thus	 becomes:	 to	 what	 extent,	 in	 which	 areas	 and	 how	 are	 we	 willing	 to	 limit	 our	sovereign	rule-making	power	to	enable	freer	trade?		
B.	How	Will	the	Choice	Be	Made?	Before	delving	 into	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 choices	 that	 the	UK	has	 to	make	 on	 its	way	towards	a	consistent	trade	policy	(vis-à-vis	the	EU	and	the	rest	of	the	world),	it	may	be	useful	 to	 consider	 to	what	extent	 the	British	electorate	has	already	made	 the	 relevant	choices	 in	 the	Brexit	 referendum.	There	 is	broad	agreement	on	all	 sides	–	 from	Prime	Minister	 Teresa	 May12	to	 the	 president	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 Martin	 Schulz,13	from	the	President	of	the	European	Commission	Jean-Claude	Juncker14	to	the	 leader	of	the	 Labour	 Party	 Jeremy	 Corbyn15	–	 that	 this	 vote	 of	 the	 people	 must	 be	 respected.	There	is,	however,	far	less	agreement	on	what	precisely	this	vote	means.		University	of	Oxford’s	Richard	Ekins	argues	that	the	voters	expressed	discontent	with	a	loss	of	control	over	who	can	enter	and	remain	within	the	UK	and	with	EU	law-making	in	general.	Politicians	accordingly	should	restore	 these	powers	 to	 the	UK	and	should	not	opt	for	permanent	EEA	membership.16	King’s	College	London’s	Vernon	Bogdanor	argues	more	specifically	that	the	people	voted	to	leave	the	EU	for	three	reasons:	to	have	control	over	EU	 immigration,	 to	reject	 jurisdiction	of	 the	European	Court	of	 Justice	and	to	not	contribute	 to	 the	 EU	 budget	 and	 that	 any	 arrangement	 must	 respect	 these	 three	
																																																								12	Theresa	May’s	keynote	speech	at	Tory	conference	in	full,	Independent,	5	October	2016,	available	at	http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-speech-tory-conference-2016-in-full-transcript-a7346171.html.	13	Most	lately	in	‘The	EU	and	the	UK	–	parting	ways	but	working	together’	speech	at	the	European	Institute	of	the	London	School	of	Economics,	23	September	2016,	available	at	http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-president/en/press-room/the-eu-and-the-uk-–-parting-ways-but-working-together-speech-at-the-european-institute-of-the-london-school-of-economics.	14	Speech	by	President	Jean-Claude	Juncker	to	the	plenary	session	of	the	European	Parliament	on	the	result	of	the	referendum	in	the	United	Kingdom,	28	June	2016,	available	at	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2353_en.htm.	15	Corbyn	says	must	respect	Brexit	vote	result,	Reuters,	21	July	2016,	available	at	http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-corbyn-idUKKCN101326.	16	See	his	presentation	at	the	roundtable	Taking	Brexit	Seriously,	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MGgGVu0urVI.	
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wishes.17	Both	scholars	thus	find	themselves	largely	in	agreement	with	the	four	roughly	similar	“red	lines”	for	negotiations	with	the	EU	that	the	British	government	has	deduced	from	the	referendum:	no	budget	payments,	 control	over	 immigration,	 law-making	and	freedom	from	jurisdiction	of	European	judges.18		However,	 such	 a	 broad	 interpretation	 of	 the	 referendum’s	mandate	 cannot	withstand	scrutiny.	The	European	Referendum	Act	2015	asked	the	following	question:	“Should	the	United	 Kingdom	 remain	 a	 member	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 or	 leave	 the	 European	Union?”	permitting	voters	to	answer	with	“Remain	a	member	of	the	European	Union”	or	“Leave	the	European	Union”.19	The	literal	mandate	of	the	referendum	is	thus	limited	to	leaving	 the	EU.	 It	 is	certainly	 true	 that	voters	had	reasons	 to	opt	 for	 “leave”	 that	went	beyond	mere	membership	of	the	Union:	surveys	show	that	many	voted	out	of	a	desire	for	national	control	over	immigration	and	laws.20	Others	hoped	for	better	NHS	funding,	feared	 Turkey’s	 accession	 to	 the	 EU,	 opposed	 free	 trade	 or	 desired	 freer	 trade.	 Some	rejected	 the	 political	 aspirations	 of	 the	 EU	 and	wanted	 the	 UK	 to	 be	 part	 of	 a	 Union	limited	 to	 economic	 matters.	 Still	 others	 wished	 to	 express	 their	 frustration	 with	political	elites.	While	politicians	will	indubitably	try	to	tap	into	these	various	motives,	it	is	 unclear	 by	 which	 methodology	 the	 referendum’s	 mandate	 can	 be	 interpreted	 to	include	 several	 or	 indeed	 any	 of	 them.	 The	 only	 question	 put	 to	 voters	 was	 on	 EU	membership.	 In	 fact,	 we	 can	 only	 determine	 the	 voters’	 underlying	 motives	 through	surveys.	Arguing	that	they	are	part	of	the	referendum’s	mandate	would	accordingly	go	beyond	respecting	the	expression	of	the	will	of	the	voters	in	an	act	of	direct	democracy	and	would	elevate	surveys	to	the	same	status	as	the	referendum.	But	 a	 broad	 interpretation	 of	 the	 referendum’s	 mandate	 is	 not	 just	 methodologically	fragile;	 it	 would	 also	 entail	 severe	 consequences	 given	 the	 nature	 of	 modern	 trade	agreements	described	above.	All	trade	agreements	limit	sovereign	law-making.	Several	trade	 agreements	 provide	 for	 some	 commitments	 in	 the	 area	 of	 free	 movement.	 To	assume	 that	 the	 UK	 electorate	 has	 rejected	 any	 type	 of	 limitation	 on	 the	 law-making	powers	of	Parliament	would	force	the	UK	to	abstain	from	free	trade	agreements	and	–	in																																																									17	See	his	presentation	at	the	roundtable	Taking	Brexit	Seriously,	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MGgGVu0urVI.	18	http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-05/u-k-has-four-red-lines-in-eu-brexit-talks-davis-aide-says.	19	Sec.	1	European	Union	Referendum	Act	2015,	c.	36.	20	See	e.g.	in	this	regard	Lord	Ashcroft	Polls	‘How	the	United	Kingdom	voted	on	Thrusday	...	and	why’,	available	at	http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/.	
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the	final	consequence	–	to	withdraw	from	the	WTO.	Nobody	has	suggested	such	a	drastic	step.	It	 is,	accordingly,	time	for	a	more	nuanced	language	and	for	admitting	that,	while	the	referendum	does	contain	a	clear	mandate	to	leave	the	EU,	the	mandate	does	not	go	beyond	this.			
C.	The	UK’s	Future	Trade	Policy	In	 (re)constituting	 its	 own	 trade	policy,	 the	British	 government	will	 be	 confronted	by	several	 challenges,	 big	 and	 small,	 short-term	 and	 long-term.	 The	 change	 brings	 about	opportunities,	too.	Identifying	both	challenges	and	opportunities	is	the	first	tall	order	for	the	British	government.	We	offer	a	flavour	of	a	few	of	them,	starting	with	the	future	UK-EU	relations,	then	discussing	the	relations	between	the	UK	and	the	rest	of	the	world	and	finally	listing	a	few	key	policy	choices.		
I.	UK	–	EU	Relations	With	 regard	 to	 a	 future	 UK-EU	 trade	 agreement,	 the	 discussion	 so	 far	 has	 been	dominated	 by	 identifying	 the	 key	 features	 of	 various	 ‘options’	 based	 on	 existing	agreements	 concluded	by	 the	EU,	 for	 example,	with	Norway,	 Switzerland,	 Turkey	 and	Canada.	An	example	of	this	kind	of	exercise	is	provided	in	the	table	reproduced	below,	which	 was	 compiled	 by	 HSBC	 (October	 2016)	 (even	 though	 we	 would	 disagree	 with	some	 of	 its	 details).21	The	 term	 ‘options’	 should	 not	 be	 understood	 as	 fixed	 model	agreements	 a	 country	 can	 choose	 between.	 Only	 the	 “Norway”	 option	 –	 EEA	Membership	 –	 (and	WTO	membership	 as	 the	 existing	 or	 default	 option	 if	 there	 is	 no	trade	 agreement	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 UK)	 come	 with	 largely	 fixed	 rights	 and	obligations	that	do	not	require	negotiation	of	every	single	detail.	All	other	‘options’	are	in	reality	individually	negotiated	deals	that	can	serve	as	a	model	only.	Unsurprisingly,	all	of	 these	models	 have	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages.	 Any	 overall	 evaluation	 –	 in	 fact	even	the	evaluation	of	different	elements	of	a	deal	–	depends	on	one’s	preference	for	the	kind	of	exit	from	the	EU	the	UK	should	opt	for.		
																																																								21	It	is,	for	example,	erroneous	to	refer	to	the	Swiss	deal	–	an	individual	deal	negotiated	and	in	force	for	Switzerland	–	as	the	EFTA	option.	In	fact,	all	other	EFTA	members	are	members	of	the	EEA.	The	inclusion	of	the	Continental	Partnership	is	misleading,	as	it	is	a	mere	proposal	for	restructuring	relations	and	it	is	unclear	to	what	extent	it	could	become	reality.	Also,	the	content	of	FTAs	can	vary	radically.	
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		Aside	from	the	necessary	approximation	of	the	key	features	of	each	option,	what	clearly	transpires	from	such	a	table	 is	 that,	at	 least	 in	principle,	many	things	are	possible.	For	example,	while	 the	Norway/EEA	option	 includes	participation	 in	 the	EU	single	market	and	compliance	with	 the	 four	 freedoms	(including	 the	 free	movement	of	persons)	and	the	 acquis	 communautaire	 with	 regard	 to	 social	 policy,	 consumer	 protection,	environmental	protection	and	company	law,	it	does	not	provide	for	participation	in	the	common	commercial	policy,	traditional	investment	protection	guarantees,	and	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	(instead	setting	up	its	own	EFTA-Court).	Similarly,	while	Canada’s	 FTA	 does	 not	 include	 participation	 in	 the	 single	market,	 it	 does	 provide	 for	(albeit	 limited)	 access	 to	 the	 single	 market	 for	 goods,	 services	 and	 key	 company	personnel,	traditional	investment	protection	guarantees	and	binding	dispute	settlement	systems.	In	fact,	some	of	the	elements	of	a	deal	that	are	often	presented	as	black	or	white	in	the	public	are	in	reality	complex	legal	constructs.22		There	 are,	 however,	 some	 constraints.	 In	 terms	 of	 legal	 constraints,	 any	 future	 post-Brexit	 trade	agreement	between	 the	UK	and	 the	EU	will	need	 to	 take	 into	account	 the																																																									22	Free	movement	of	persons	for	example	is	not	granted	without	limitations	even	under	current	EU	law.	See	Directive	2004/38.	
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law	of	the	WTO,	as	both	the	UK	and	the	EU	remain	members	of	the	WTO.	In	particular,	WTO	Members	are	bound	by	the	MFN	principle	prohibiting	any	discrimination	between	WTO	Members.	However,	as	long	as	the	future	bilateral	agreement	meets	the	conditions	specified	in	WTO	law	(specifically,	Art.	XXIV	GATT	and	Art.	V	GATS),	the	agreement	will	be	exempted	from	the	general	MFN	obligation.		Furthermore,	 the	EU	 (and	possibly	 the	UK	as	well)	will	 also	need	 to	 consider	 its	MFN	obligations	 found	 in	 the	various	bilateral	 trade	agreements	 that	 it	has	 concluded	with	third	countries.	This	is	particularly	so	as	the	most	recent	FTAs	concluded	by	the	EU	(for	example,	with	Korea,	Vietnam	and	Canada)	provide	for	much	narrower	MFN	exceptions,	applicable	 to	 deeper	 forms	 of	 regional	 integration,	 only.	 For	 example,	 with	 regard	 to	trade	in	services	and	investment	in	the	EU-Canada	Comprehensive	Economic	and	Trade	Agreement	(CETA),	the	EU	right	to	accord	differential	treatment	to	a	country	pursuant	to	 a	 future	 agreement	 is	 limited	 only	 to	 any	 agreement,	 which	 “creates	 an	 internal	market	in	services	and	investment”,	“grants	the	right	of	establishment”	or	“requires	the	approximation	of	legislation	in	one	or	more	economic	sectors”.23		Finally,	 some	options	are	 logically	 linked:	 thus,	becoming	member	of	 a	 customs	union	with	 a	 common	 outer	 tariff	 necessarily	 implies	 refraining	 from	 concluding	 individual	agreements	committing	the	state	to	further	reduce	tariffs.			Other	constraints	are	of	a	political	nature.	For	example,	the	EU	will	have	to	bear	in	mind	the	political	effects	of	a	deal	with	the	UK	in	its	Member	States.	Thus,	the	EU	will	not	be	able	to	offer	a	deal	to	the	UK	that	could	empower	eurosceptics	in	other	Member	States	and	 undermine	 the	 stability	 of	 the	 Union.	 This	 is	 a	 constraint	 that	 is	 far	 more	threatening	 than	 any	 immediate	 resentment	 felt	 by	 the	 EU	 due	 to	 Brexit.	 They	 also	explain	repeated	statements	by	Guy	Verhofstadt,	the	European	Parliament’s	chief	Brexit	negotiator	that	any	new	deal	between	the	EU	and	the	UK	could	not	infringe	on	the	four	fundamental	freedoms	that	underpin	the	European	Union.		Within	this	context,	it	will	be	the	British	government’s	goal	to	reach	a	trade	deal	with	the	EU	that,	on	the	one	hand,	manages	to	mirror	as	much	as	possible	the	current	benefits	of																																																									23	See	EU	Schedule	in	Annex	II	of	CETA.	
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the	internal	market	(for	example,	just	to	name	a	few,	no	tariffs	on	the	import/export	of	certain	 products,	 like	 cars	 and	 car	 parts,	 and	 the	 right	 of	 British-based	 financial	institutions	 to	 provide	 a	 wide	 spectrum	 of	 services	 pursuant	 to	 their	 British	authorizations)	while	on	the	other	respecting	the	 legal	and	political	constraints,	which	each	side	has	to	take	into	account.		
II.	The	UK	and	the	Wider	World	The	complexities	do	not	diminish	when	it	comes	to	the	British	trade	policy	vis-à-vis	the	rest	 of	 the	world.	 The	 first	 issue	 in	 this	 regard	 is	 the	 UK’s	membership	 in	 the	World	Trade	Organization.	The	level	of	trade	liberalisation	granted	by	each	WTO	Member	and	captured	 in	 each	 Member’s	 schedule	 of	 commitments	 constitutes	 a	 baseline	 for	negotiating	 bilateral	 or	 regional	 free	 trade	 agreements	with	 other	 states.	While	 there	can	be	little	debate	about	the	UK	being	a	member	of	the	WTO,	there	is	uncertainty	with	regard	to	how	the	UK	and	the	EU	will	be	able	to	rescind	their	union	with	regard	to	the	currently	 common	set	of	 (EU)	 schedules.	The	 least	painful	 approach	 to	 separating	 the	UK	 schedule	 from	 the	 EU	 one	 would	 consist	 in	 maintaining	 the	 same	 commitments	where	 possible	 (with	 regard	 to	 ad	 valorem	 tariffs	 and	 commitment	 in	 services).	Complications	 arise	 with	 respect	 to	 separating	 commitments	 that	 are	 quantitative	 in	nature	(in	particular	the	so-called	tariff-rate	quotas),	which	despite	guiding	legal	rules	in	the	GATT,	are	likely	to	require	negotiations	with	other	Members.24		Another	issue	is	the	fate	of	all	trade	agreements	concluded	and	signed	by	the	EU,	often	jointly	with	the	UK	(so	called	‘mixed	agreements’),25	and	third	countries	(such	as	Mexico,	South	Africa,	and	Korea).	It	is	not	clear	whether	these	FTAs	will	continue	to	apply	both	between	 the	 EU27	 and	 the	 third	 country	 as	 well	 as	 between	 the	 UK	 and	 the	 third	country,	 subject	 to	 the	necessary	adjustment,	particularly	 in	 terms	of	each	contracting	party’s	schedule	of	commitments.	Such	a	continuation	might	be	unlikely	with	respect	to	EU-only	agreements,	but	less	so	with	respect	to	mixed	agreements.	Alternatively,	Brexit	
																																																								24	See	Lorand	Bartels	“The	UK’s	Status	in	the	WTO	after	Brexit”	(Sept	2016)	available	at	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2841747.	25	In	the	EU	legal	system,	‘mixed	agreements’	are	those	international	agreements	that	need	to	be	concluded	by	the	EU	and	its	Member	States	acting	jointly,	due	to	the	fact	that	EU	competences	do	not	cover	the	entire	scope	of	the	agreement.		
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may	 be	 considered	 to	 represent	 a	 fundamental	 change	 of	 circumstances	 under	international	law	and	allow	states	to	terminate	or	modify	the	agreement	accordingly.26		Finally	none	of	these	various	puzzle	pieces	can	be	regarded	in	isolation.	First,	there	is	an	issue	of	sequencing.	It	will	be	difficult	for	the	UK	to	reach	(and	even	begin	negotiating)	a	deal	with	a	third	country	before	and	until	its	trade	relations	with	the	EU	and	in	the	WTO	are	clarified.	Secondly,	trade	agreements	are	interdependent:	if	the	UK	agrees	to	adopt	specific	policies	in	one,	it	has	limited	its	negotiation	options	for	all	other	agreements.			
III.	Policy	Choices	In	outlining	its	future	trade	policy,	the	UK	will	be	faced	with	difficult	policy	choices	that	require	democratic	debate	and	discussion.	Negotiating	an	issue	in	a	trade	agreement	–	whether	 it	 is	 intellectual	 property	 law	or	 agricultural	 subsidies	 –	 requires	 an	 internal	policy	decision	which	may	be	complex	to	achieve:	is	a	state	convinced	that	geographical	indications	 are	 a	 well-founded	 concept	 of	 intellectual	 property	 or	 that	 trademarks	should	override	them?	Are	agricultural	subsidies	required	to	maintain	national	farming	or	 a	 distortion	 of	 trade?	 Out	 of	 the	myriad	 issues	 that	 can	 become	 relevant	 in	 trade	negotiations	we	would	like	to	highlight	here	four	that	are	today	particularly	topical	and	controversial:	public	services,	regulatory	cooperation,	investor-State	dispute	settlement	and	non-trade	values.			
Public	services:	Despite	the	strong	interest	by	certain	service	sectors	to	achieve	greater	access	to	foreign	markets	both	in	terms	of	cross-border	provision	of	services	as	well	as	foreign	direct	 investment,	 there	are	equally	 strong	 feelings	 in	 the	UK	 (and	elsewhere)	against	 privatising	 certain	 public	 services	 particularly	 if	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 foreign	multinationals.	The	European	Commission	has	struggled,	especially	in	the	context	of	its	trade	 negotiations	 with	 the	 United	 States	 (the	 so	 called	 Transatlantic	 Trade	 and	Investment	 Partnership	 or	 TTIP),	 to	 show	 that	 liberalisation	 of	 trade	 in	 services	 and	investment	protection	does	not	equate	with	privatisation	of	public	services.	While	this	is	in	 principle	 correct,	 a	 lot	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 legal	 details	 of	 the	 trade	 agreement																																																									26	See	Article	62	of	the	1969	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	Treaties	(requiring	that	(a)	the	circumstances	existing	at	the	time	of	the	conclusion	of	the	treaty	were	indeed	objectively	essential	to	the	obligations	of	treaty	and	(b)	the	instance	wherein	the	change	of	circumstances	has	had	a	radical	effect	on	the	obligations	of	the	treaty).	
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including	the	way	in	which	the	various	disciplines	covering	trade	in	services	and	foreign	investment	will	be	interpreted	by	the	relevant	dispute	settlement	system.			
Regulatory	 cooperation:	 In	 terms	 of	 obtaining	 greater	 access	 to	 foreign	markets	 for	both	goods	and	services,	regulatory	cooperation	has	become	a	necessary	ingredient	of	a	modern	 trade	 negotiation.	 Multiple	 and	 different	 technical	 regulations	 and	 processes	applicable	at	the	national	level	may	add	unnecessary	costs	to	the	production	and	sale	of	products	as	well	as	the	provision	of	services.	While	some	disciplines	already	exist	within	the	 context	 of	 the	WTO,	 recent	 regional	 trade	negotiations	have	 tried	 to	 go	 further	 in	order	 to	 strengthen	 the	 regulatory	 cooperation	 aimed	 at	 eliminating	 the	 unnecessary	costs	 of	 regulation,	 without	 however	 lowering	 the	 protection	 for	 people’s	 health,	 the	well-being	of	 consumers,	and	 the	environment.	The	challenge	here	 is	 to	 identify	 those	instruments	that	are	able	to	achieve	an	acceptable	balance	between	the	two	aims.	In	the	area	of	 services,	 and	of	particular	 interest	 for	 the	UK,	 in	 the	area	of	 financial	 services,	this	kind	of	cooperation	appears	to	be	as	indispensible	(in	terms	of	increasing	access	to	foreign	 markets)	 as	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 achieve	 (the	 systemic	 importance	 of	 financial	markets	makes	this	one	of	the	most	sensitive	areas	for	(national)	regulation).27		
Investor-State	 Dispute	 Settlement	 (ISDS):	 As	 the	 traditional	 mechanism,	 based	heavily	 on	 commercial	 arbitration,	 found	 in	 many	 existing	 investment	 and	 trade	agreements	 to	 deal	 with	 investment	 disputes	 has	 recently	 been	 subject	 to	 strong	criticism,	the	pressure	for	reform	will	likely	spread	in	the	near	future.	In	its	most	recent	FTAs	(eg.,	with	Canada	and	Vietnam),	the	EU	has	already	put	forward	a	new	investment	court	system	(ICS)	made	up	by	a	permanent	Tribunal	and	Appeal	mechanism	composed	by	 individuals	 appointed	 by	 the	 contracting	 parties	 and	 subject	 to	 strict	 ethical	 rules	aimed	at	ensuring	independence	and	impartiality.	There	are	also	early	suggestions	(by	the	EU	and	the	United	Nations)	to	develop	a	multilateral	investment	court	that	could	in	the	 future	 replace	 current	 ISDS	 systems	 in	 existing	 and	 future	 investment	 and	 trade	agreements,	 and	potentially	 strengthen	 the	 consistency	and	efficiency	of	 an	 important	and	controversial	feature	of	modern	trade	policy.																																																										27	Beyond	the	regional	setting,	the	UK	could	play	a	pivotal	role	in	the	plurilateral	negotiations	currently	being	lead	by	23	WTO	Members	on	the	Trade	in	Services	Agreement	(TiSA).	
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Non-trade	values:	As	the	European	integration	process	has	certainly	shown,	the	greater	the	economic	integration	one	is	pursuing,	the	greater	the	need	to	address	a	host	of	non-trade	issues.	A	large	part	of	the	debate	in	international	economic	law	and	policy	in	the	last	 twenty	 years	 has	 focused	 on	 ensuring	 that	 international	 agreements	 aimed	 at	liberalising	 trade	 and	 encouraging	 foreign	 investment	 do	 not	 inappropriately	 restrain	the	 ability	 of	 states	 to	 regulate	 in	 the	 public	 interest	 (for	 example,	 public	 health,	consumer	 protection,	 labour	 rights,	 public	 morals,	 the	 environment).	 However,	 more	recently	 there	 have	 been	 efforts	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 these	 agreements,	 in	 addition	 to	guarantee	 the	 so	 called	 ‘right	 to	 regulate’,	 are	 drafted	 in	 ways	 to	 more	 directly	contribute	 to	 the	 promotion	 of	 a	 wider	 set	 of	 values	 and	 goals	 beyond	 trade	liberalisation	 and	 investment	 protection.	 For	 example,	 several	 countries	 (including	Canada	 and	 the	 EU)	 now	 expressly	 acknowledge	 their	 commitment	 to	 (i)	 sustainable	development	as	a	core	objective	of	 their	FTAs	and	(ii)	 foster	 the	contribution	of	 trade	and	 investment	 to	 such	 objective.	 CETA,	 for	 example,	 includes	 commitments	 for	 the	protection	 of	 workers’	 rights	 and	 the	 environment.	 There	 is	 scope,	 however,	 for	increasing	 even	more	 the	 benefits	 that	 trade	 agreements	 can	 have	 on	 a	 wider	 set	 of	interests.	 For	 example,	 traditional	 investment	 protection	 disciplines	 could	 be	accompanied	by	new	investment	regulation	ones	that	focus,	for	example,	on	disciplining	anti-competitive	behaviour,	corporate	governance,	taxation	and	State	contracts.28	
	
Conclusion	The	 task	ahead	 for	 the	UK	on	 its	 road	 towards	 its	own	 trade	policy	 is	a	daunting	one.	Many	 complex	 and	 interrelated	 policy	 decisions	 will	 have	 to	 be	 taken.	 A	 careful	 and	thorough	approach	has	to	rely	on	consultations	with	all	stakeholders,	civil	society	–	and	of	course	involve	Parliament.	The	decisions	taken	in	the	next	few	years	will	have	a	deep	and	lasting	impact	on	the	UK	for	decades	to	come.	
																																																								28	Peter	Muchlinski	Multinational	Enterprises	and	the	Law	(OUP,	2007).	
